We are told that so long as we withhold this power from Congress we shall bea weak, despised people. We were long contending for Independence, and now weare in a passion to be rid of it. But let us attempt to reason on this subject,and see to which side that will lead us. Reason is truly defined, in all casesshort of mathematical demonstration, to be a supposing that the like causes willproduce the like effects. Let us proceed by this rule. The Swiss Cantons for ahundred years have remained separate Independent States, consequently withoutany controlling power. Even the little Republic of St. Marino, containingperhaps but little more ground than the town of Newport, and about five thousandinhabitants, surrounded by powerful and ambitious neighbors, has kept itsfreedom and independence these thirteen hundred years, and is mentioned bytravellers as a very enlightened and happy people. If these small republics, inthe neighborhood of the warlike and intriguing Courts of Paris, Vienna, andBerlin, have kept their freedom and original form of government, is it notreasonable to suppose that the same good sense and love of freedom, on this sidethe Atlantic, will secure us from all attempt within and without. And the onlyinternal discord that has happened in Switzerland was on a religious account,and a supreme controlling power is no security against this, as appears by whathappened in Ireland in the time of Charles the First, and in France in the timeof Henry the Fourth. It seems rational in a case of this importance to consultthe opinion of the ablest men, and to whom can we better appeal than to J. J. Rousseau, a republican by birth and education - one of the most exalted geniusesand one of the greatest writers of his age, or perhaps any age; a man the mostdisinterested and benevolent towards mankind; a man the most industrious in theacquisition of knowledge and information, by travel, conversation, reading, andthinking; and one who has wrote a Volume on Government entitled the SocialContract, wherein he inculcates, that the people should examine and determineevery public act themselves. His words are, that "every law that thepeople have not ratified in person, is void; it is no law. The people ofEngland think they are free. They are much mistaken. They are never so butduring the election of members of Parliament. As soon as they are elected, theyare slaves, they are nothing. And by the use they make of their liberty duringthe short moments they possess it, they well deserve to lose it. " This isfar from advising that thirty thousand souls should resign their judgments andwishes entirely to one man for two years - to a man, who, perhaps, may go fromhome sincere and patriotic but by the time he has dined in pomp for a week withthe wealthy citizens of New York or Philadelphia, will have lost all his rigidideas of economy and equality. He becomes fascinated with the elegancies andluxuries of wealth. . . . Objects and intimations like these soon change thechampion for the people to an advocate for power; and the people, findingthemselves thus basely betrayed, cry that virtue is but a name. We are not surethat men have more virtue at this time and place than they had in England in thetime of George the Second. Let anyone look into the history of those times, andsee with what boldness men changed sides and deserted the people in pursuit ofprofit and power. If to take up the cross and renounce the pomps and vanitiesof this sinful world is a hard lesson for divines, 'tis much harder forpoliticians. A Cincinnatus, a Cato, a Fabricius, and a Washington, are rarelyto be found. We are told that the Trustees of our powers and freedom, beingmostly married men, and all of them inhabitants and proprietors of the country,is an ample security against an abuse of power. Whether human nature be lesscorrupt than formerly I will not determine - but this I know: that Julius Caesar,Oliver Cromwell, and the nobles of Venice, were natives and inhabitants of thecountries whose power they usurped and drenched in blood.
It is not meant, by stating this case, to insinuate that the Constitutionwould warrant a law of this kind! Or unnecessarily to alarm the fears of thepeople, by suggesting that the Federal legislature would be more likely to passthe limits assigned them by the Constitution, than that of an individual State,further than they are less responsible to the people. But what is meant is,that the legislature of the United States are vested with the great anduncontrollable powers of laying and collecting taxes, duties, imposts, andexcises; of regulating trade, raising and supporting armies, organizing, arming,and disciplining the militia, instituting courts, and other general powers; andare by this clause invested with the power of making all laws, proper andnecessary, for carrying all these into execution; and they may so exercise thispower as entirely to annihilate all the State governments, and reduce thiscountry to one single government. And if they may do it, it is pretty certainthey will; for it will be found that the power retained by individual States,small as it is, will be a clog upon the wheels of the government of the UnitedStates; the latter, therefore, will be naturally inclined to remove it out ofthe way. Besides, it is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages,that every man, and every body of men, invested with power, are ever disposed toincrease it, and to acquire a superiority over everything that stands in theirway. This disposition, which is implanted in human nature, will operate in theFederal legislature to lessen and ultimately to subvert the State authority, andhaving such advantages, will most certainly succeed, if the Federal governmentsucceeds at all. It must be very evident, then, that what this Constitutionwants of being a complete consolidation of the several parts of the union intoone complete government, possessed of perfect legislative, judicial, andexecutive powers, to all intents and purposes, it will necessarily acquire inits exercise in operation.
However, the lease should be consulted to be sure a formal notice is not required.If a tenant stays beyond the expiration of the lease, and the landlord accepts the next month's rent, the tenant then is assumed to be renting under a month-to-month agreement.A tenant who leaves before a lease expires is responsible for paying the rent for the rest of the lease.
However, it is important that tenants check their own rental agreements to determine what kind of notice must be given before they move out.Leases. If the tenant moves out at the expiration of a lease, in most cases it is not necessary to give the landlord a written notice.
If this is not done, the tenant may not be liable for rent beyond a reasonable period of time.Month-to-Month Rental Agreements. When a tenant wants to end a month-to-month rental agreement, written notice must be given to the landlord.
The first object declared to be in view, is "To form a more perfectunion." It is to be observed, it is not an union of states or bodiescorporate; had this been the case the existence of the state governments mighthave been secured. But it is a union of the people of the United Statesconsidered as one body, who are to ratify this constitution if it is adopted. Now to make a union of this kind perfect, it is necessary to abolish allinferior governments, and to give the general one complete legislative,executive and judicial powers to every purpose. The courts therefore willestablish it as a rule in explaining the constitution; to give it such aconstruction as will best tend to perfect the union or take from the stategovernments every power of either making or executing laws. The second objectis "to establish justice." This must include not only the idea ofinstituting the rule of justice, or of making laws which shall be the measure orrule of right, but also of providing for the application of this rule or ofadministering justice under it. And under this the courts will in theirdecisions extend the power of the government to all cases they possibly can, orotherwise they will be restricted in doing what appears to be the intent of theconstitution they should do, to wit, pass laws and provide for the execution ofthem, for the general distribution of justice between man and man. Another enddeclared is "to insure domestic tranquility." This comprehends aprovision against all private breaches of the peace, as well as against allpublic commotions or general insurrections; and to attain the object of thisclause fully, the government must exercise the power of passing laws in thesesubjects, as well as of appointing magistrates with authority to execute them. And the courts will adopt these ideas in their expositions. I might proceed tothe other clause, in the preamble, and it would appear by a consideration of allof them separately, as it does by taking them together, that if the spirit ofthis system is to be known from its declared end and design in the preamble, itsspirit is to subvert and abolish all the powers of the state governments, and toembrace every object to which any government extends.
I shall now proceed to show how this power will operate in its exercise toeffect these purposes. . . . First, let us inquire how the judicial power willeffect an extension of the legislative authority.
Much has been said and written upon the subject of this new system on bothsides, but I have not met with any writer who has discussed the judicial powerswith any degree of accuracy. And yet it is obvious, that we can gain but veryimperfect ideas of the manner in which this government will work, or the effectit will have in changing the internal police and mode of distributing justice atpresent subsisting in the respective states, without a thorough investigation ofthe powers of the judiciary and of the manner in which they will operate. Thisgovernment is a complete system, not only for making, but for executing laws. And the courts of law, which will be constituted by it, are not only to decideupon the constitution and the laws made in pursuance of it, but by officerssubordinate to them to execute all their decisions. The real effect of thissystem of government, will therefore be brought home to the feelings of thepeople, through the medium of the judicial power. It is, moreover, of greatimportance, to examine with care the nature and extent of the judicial power,because those who are to be vested with it, are to be placed in a situationaltogether unprecedented in a free country. They are to be rendered totallyindependent, both of the people and the legislature, both with respect to theiroffices and salaries. No errors they may commit can be corrected by any powerabove them, if any such power there be, nor can they be removed from office formaking ever so many erroneous adjudications.
In considering the legislators, in relation to the subject before us, twointeresting questions particularly arise: 1. whether they ought to be eligibleto hold any offices whatever during the period for which they shall be electedto serve, and even for some time afterwards. 2. how far they ought toparticipate in the power of appointments. As to the first, it is true thatlegislators in foreign countries, or in our state governments, are not generallymade ineligible to office. There are good reasons for it. In many countriesthe people have gone on without ever examining the principles of government. There have been but few countries in which the legislators have been aparticular set of men periodically chosen. But the principal reason is, thatwhich operates in the several states, viz., the legislators are so frequentlychosen, and so numerous, compared with the number of offices for which they canreasonably consider themselves as candidates, that the chance of any individualmember's being chosen, is too small to raise his hopes or expectations, or tohave any considerable influence upon his conduct. Among the state legislators,one man in twenty may be appointed in some committee business, etc., for a monthor two; but on a fair computation, not one man in a hundred sent to the statelegislatures is appointed to any permanent office of profit. Directly thereverse of this will evidently be found true in the federal administration. Throughout the United States, about four federal senators, and thirty-threerepresentatives, averaging the elections, will be chosen in a year. These fewmen may rationally consider themselves as the fairest candidates for a verygreat number of lucrative offices, which must become vacant in the year; andpretty clearly a majority of the federal legislators, if not excluded, will bemere expectants for public offices. I need not adduce further arguments toestablish a position so clear. I need only call to your recollection myobservations in a former letter, wherein I endeavored to show the fallacy of theargument, that the members must return home and mix with the people. It issaid, that men are governed by interested motives, and will not attend aslegislators, unless they can, in common with others, be eligible to offices ofhonor and profit. This will undoubtedly be the case with some men, but Ipresume only with such men as never ought to be chosen legislators in a freecountry. An opposite principle will influence good men. Virtuous patriots, andgenerous minds, will esteem it a higher honor to be selected as the guardians ofa free people. They will be satisfied with a reasonable compensation for theirtime and service; nor will they wish to be within the vortex of influence. Thevaluable effects of this principle of making legislators ineligible to officesfor a given time, has never yet been sufficiently attended to or considered. Iam assured that it was established by the convention after long debate, andafterwards, on an unfortunate change of a few members, altered. Could thefederal legislators be excluded in the manner proposed, I think it would be animportant point gained; as to themselves, they would be left to act much morefrom motives consistent with the public good. In considering the principle ofrotation I had occasion to distinguish the condition of a legislator from thatof a mere official man. We acquire certain habits, feelings, and opinions, asmen and citizens-others, and very different ones, from a long continuance inoffice. It is, therefore, a valuable observation in many bills of rights, thatrulers ought frequently to return and mix with the people. A legislature, in afree country, must be numerous; it is in some degree a periodical assemblage ofthe people, frequently formed. The principal officers in the executive andjudicial departments must have more permanency in office. Hence it may beinferred, that the legislature will remain longer uncorrupted and virtuous;longer congenial to the people, than the officers of those departments. If itis not, therefore in our power to preserve republican principles for a series ofages, in all the departments of government, we may a long while preserve them ina well formed legislature. To this end we ought to take every precaution toprevent legislators becoming mere office-men; choose them frequently, make themrecallable, establish rotation among them, make them ineligible to offices, andgive them as small a share as possible in the disposal of them. Add to this, alegislature in the nature of things is not formed for the detail business ofappointing officers, there is also generally an impropriety in the same menmaking offices and filling them, and a still greater impropriety in theirimpeaching and trying the officers they appoint. For these and other reasons, Iconclude the legislature is not a proper body for the appointment of officers ingeneral. But having gone through with the different modes of appointment, Ishall endeavor to show what share in the distribution of the power ofappointments the legislature must, from necessity, rather than from propriety,take.
Before martial law is declared to be the supreme law of the land, and yourcharacter of free citizens be changed to that of the subjects of a militaryking - which are necessary consequences of the adoption of the proposedconstitution - let me admonish you in the name of sacred liberty, to make asolemn pause. Permit a freeman to address you, and to solicit your attention toa cause wherein yourselves and your posterity are concerned. The sun nevershone upon a more important one. It is the cause of freedom of a wholecontinent of yourselves and of your fellow men. . . .