The above citations may be used as the basis for further reading onthis subject in the following way. Influential statements of theclassical interpretation of Hume's intentions can be found in Flew(1962), Penelhum (1975) and Stroud (1977). Prominent statements of20th century classical compatibilism that are generallytaken to follow in Hume's tracks include Schlick (1939), Ayer (1954)and Smart (1961). Davidson (1963) provides an important statement ofthe causal theory of action based on broadly Humean principles. Acomplete statement of the naturalistic interpretation is provided inRussell (1995), esp. Part I. For a critical response to this study seePenelhum (1998; 2000a), and also the earlier exchange between Russell(1983, 1985) and Flew (1984). The contributions by Botterill (2002)and Pitson (2002, 2006) follow up on some the issues that are at stakehere. For an account of Hume's views on punishment – a topicthat is closely connected with the problem of free will – seeRussell (1990) and Russell (1995 – Chp. 10). For a generalaccount of the 18th century debate that Hume was involvedin see Harris (2005). See also O'Higgins introduction [in Collins(1717)] for further background. The works by Hobbes, Locke, Clarke andCollins, as cited above, are essential reading for an understanding ofthe general free will debate that Hume was involved in. Smith (1759)is a valuable point of contrast in relation to Hume's views, insofaras Smith develops a naturalistic theory of responsibility based onmoral sentiment (which Strawson follows up on). However, Smith doesnot discuss the free will issue directly (which is itself a point ofsome significance). In contrast with this, Reid (1788) is perhapsHume's most effective and distinguished contemporary critic on thissubject and his contribution remains of considerable interest andvalue. With respect to Hume's views on free will as they relate to hismore general irreligious intentions see Russell (2008 –esp. Chp. 16). Similar material is covered in Russell(forthcoming). The relevance of Hume's views on free will to his“Hobbist” project in the Treatise is discussed inRussell (1985) and, in further detail, in Russell (2008 –esp. Chps. 6,16,18). Garrett (1997) provides a lucid overview andcareful analysis of Hume's views on liberty and necessity, whichincludes discussion of the theological side of Hume's arguments andconcerns. Helpful introductions discussing recent developments incompatibilist thinking, which are of obvious relevance for anassessment of the contemporary value of Hume's views on this subject,can be found in McKenna (2004) and Kane (2005). Among the variouspoints of contrast not discussed in this article, Frankfurt (1971) isan influential and important paper that aims to advance the classicalcompatibilist strategy beyond the bounds of accounts of freedom ofaction. However, as noted in the main text of this article, the workof P.F. Strawson (1962, 1985) is of particular importance in respectof the contemporary significance and relevance of Hume's naturalisticstrategy. Various recent responses to Strawson's naturalism can befound in McKenna and Russell (2008). For important and insightfulstatements of the Strawsonian or naturalistic approach to issues offree will and moral responsibility see Wallace (1994), McKenna (2012),and Shoemaker (forthcoming).
In comparing the different views on human will and the maxims established to determine moral worth by David Hume and Immanuel Kant, I find their theories on morality have some merit although limited in view....
In a sense, sections II and IV constitute the core of Hume's .}Section IV: Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the UnderstandingPart I1. Hume claims that all objects of human reasonor inquiry (all propositions) fall into one of two classes: relationsof ideas and matters of fact (this division is called Humes Fork). What examples does he give of relations of ideas? In what sciencesor disciplines does one usually find them? Only in mathematics? Are they discovered or known a priori or a posteriori? Explain thedifference between a priori and a posteriori.
The spontaneity argument, as Hume presents it, is generallythought to contain the seeds of an essentially forward-looking andutilitarian account of moral responsibility. That is, Hume, followingthinkers like Thomas Hobbes, points out that rewards and punishmentsserve to cause people to act in some ways and not in others and thatthis is clearly a matter of considerable social utility (T,22.214.171.124/410; EU, 8.2897–98). Hume's brief remarks on this subjecthave been further developed by other compatibilists with whom Hume isoften closely identified (e.g., Moritz Schlick and J.J.C. Smart) Thissort of forward-looking, utilitarian account of responsibility has beensubject to telling criticism. The basic problem with this account, itis argued, is that it is entirely blind to matters of desertand thus lacks the required (backward-looking) retributiveelement demanded in this sphere. Moreover, such a theory ofresponsibility, critics claim, is at the same time both too wide andtoo narrow. It is too wide because it would appear to make children andanimals responsible; and it is too narrow insofar as it would appear todeny that those who are dead, or beyond the reach of the relevant formsof “treatment”, can be judged responsible for theiractions. In short, all efforts to interpret responsibility along theseforward-looking, utilitarian lines seem to be plagued withdifficulties.
My wife, my daughters, and I have lost our beautiful son and brother, James Ransom, 2003-2013 to the long-term psychological effects of a traumatic brain injury. My family believes it is important that people know that James was not depressed, he was a boy with a pre-born intensity and stress-causing sense of need to always do the right thing, who suffered a serious brain injury that damaged his ability to handle the blow to his life that his injury had caused.
The naturalistic interpretation, by contrast, makes it plain thatany such view of Hume's approach and general strategy is deeplymistaken. Hume, no less than Strawson, is especially concerned to drawour attention to the facts about human nature that are relevant to aproper understanding of the nature and conditions of moralresponsibility. More specifically, Hume argues that we cannot properlyaccount for moral responsibility unless we acknowledge and describe therole that moral sentiment plays in this sphere. Indeed, unlikeStrawson, Hume is much more concerned with the detailed mechanismwhereby our moral sentiments are aroused, and thus he is particularlyconcerned to explain the relevance of spontaneity, indifference, andnecessity to the functioning of moral sentiment. To this extent,therefore, Hume's naturalistic approach is more tightly woven into hisaccount of the nature of necessity and moral freedom. In sum, when wecompare Hume's arguments with Strawson's important and influentialdiscussion, it becomes immediately apparent that there is considerablecontemporary significance to the contrast between the classical andnaturalistic interpretations of Hume's reconciling strategy.
The writer uses intelligent references and humor to explain why today's computer cannot lie because it cannot yet "think"--using an analogy to Descartes' "I think, therefore I am." To prove the technological thesis, the paper discusses thoughts about the human brain, digital "thinking," digital v.
David Hume, however, holds a different position on skepticism in his work An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, for he criticizes Descartes’ claim because “‘it is impossible,’” (qtd....
Using the idea behind Leibniz’s Law, “different properties, different things”, Descartes’ begins to construct his argument for the reasons he believes that the mind and body are completely different things.
If asked to pass quick judgment on Hume's “reconcilingproject”, as interpreted along the naturalistic lines outlined inthe previous section, many contemporary philosophers would probably beinclined to say that it appears to be, quite simply, anachronistic,eighteenth-century psychology. So considered, it is of little or norelevance to contemporary issues. Indeed, some philosophersmay take the view that the philosophical interest—if not thephilosophical substance—of Hume's compatibilism has been entirelyremoved. Surely, any attempt to describe the circumstances in whichcertain sentiments are aroused in us is hopelessly irrelevant to ourpresent-day concerns and based wholly on assumptions that have longsince been rejected. In particular, we can hardly take seriously anenterprise that asks us to understand the complex issue of moralresponsibility in terms of feelings.
The following entry presents recent criticism on Hume's works.
Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary (1758) is a two-volume compilation of essays by David Hume.
This paper discusses the varieties of philosophical skepticism and explains the various skeptical arguments and responses to philosophical skepticism, along with both Hume, and Descartes take on skepticism.
The second sense in which Hume's reconciling project may be said to benaturalistic is that it stresses the role of feeling, asopposed to reason, in resolving this dispute. An appreciation of thissort of naturalism in Hume's philosophy is, as a number ofdistinguished commentators have argued, of great importance if we areto get a balanced and complete picture of Hume's philosophy. (KempSmith, 1941) On the one hand, Hume is clearly anxious to show thelimitations of human reason and is, in particular, anxious toshow that reason alone is incapable of resolving the variousphilosophical problems that he comes to consider in the course of theTreatise. There is, on the other hand, a“positive”, non-sceptical aspect to Hume's teaching thatargues for the important role of feeling in human life, and that itthis is essential for solving some the basic philosophical problemsthat we are presented with — including the free willproblem.