As a matter of constitutional interpretation, Justice Ginsburg thinks it unlikely that the Founding Fathers would conceive of the debate over copyright duration in terms of economic outcomes:
The submission made a number of circumspect points about the economic effect of the legislation. First, the longer term for new works provides only a marginal increase in anticipated compensation for an author. Second, the term extension for existing works makes no significant contribution to an author's economic incentive to create, since in this case the additional compensation was granted after the relevant investment had already been made. Third, the legislation extends the period during which a copyright holder determines the quantity produced of a work, and thus increases the inefficiency from above-cost pricing that is by lengthening its duration. Finally, the legislation extends the period during which a copyright holder determines the production of derivative works, which affects the creation of new works that are built in part out of materials from existing works.
In the wake of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, Lawrence Lessig has put forward a fall-back position, which he has been developing in his books . He maintains that copyright law should be transformed into a registration system, such as patent and trademark law, with renewable protection:
Such a model has been developed by members of the Chicago school of law and economics. Landes and Posner put forward the solution of perpetual protection of copyright through a registration system of renewable protection . Posner observes: "The solution might be a system of indefinitely renewable copyrights. The initial grant might be for twenty-five years, renewable thereafter every five years. A stiff fee would assure that most works returned to the public domain. But those works requiring continuing investment or careful management to avoid consumer exhaustion would continue to be owned property" . The authors engage in an economic analysis of the expected duration of copyrights and trademarks, using data on registrations and renewals over the past 90 years. They insist that a system of indefinite copyright renewals need not starve the public domain. Landes and Posner finish with the tongue-in-cheek conclusion that this system of copyright protection would be free of the costs associated with legislative lobbying by copyright owners and users alike.
Justice Breyer asks the rhetorical question, "What potential Shakespeare, Wharton, or Hemingway would be moved by such a sum?"  His point is that the incentive theory of copyright law provides no support for the extension of the copyright term.
In the same vein, there are definitely two sides to the argument for placing one's works directly in to the Public Domain. On the positive side, you can be sure that your work will live on after you do. People will make copies of your work in different formats for you to preserve the work, and you can list your works among numerous historical works in many of the public domain archives available. Your work will most likely have derivative works created from it because artists will often create from existing work simply because they know they can. But really, these days, placing your work in the Public Domain is more of a political statement, should you wish to make that point that the information your work contains is so important that you release all claims in order to just "get it out there." Or, sometimes, this action represents that your work is built upon works already in the Public Domain, and therefore you do not wish to lock up your derivative work based on that Public Domain work under the restrictions of traditional Copyright. (Disney's Snow White is a good example of a derivative work based on a Public Domain work that is now locked up under Disney's traditional Copyright for its film.) One might also place their work under the Public Domain as an act of support and dedication towards rebuilding our Public Domain.
#1: Do you understand the term fair use? Just because you provide attribution and/or a link back to the original doesn’t mean you’re free and clear. Fair use has nothing to do with attribution. That’s an issue related to plagiarism, which is different from copyright.
Justice Ginsburg also considers congressional practice with respect to the extension of patents. Her Honour found it significant that early Congresses extended the duration of numerous individual patents as well as copyrights. As early as , the Court made it plain that the Intellectual Property clause permits Congress to amplify an existing patent's terms. Justice Ginsburg concludes: "The CTEA follows this historical practice by keeping the duration provisions of the 1976 Act largely in place and simply adding 20 years to each of them. Guided by text, history, and precedent, we cannot agree with petitioners' submission that extending the duration of existing copyrights is categorically beyond Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause" .
Justice Breyer essentially upholds the contention of the petitioners: "Against the background of these concerns over corruption, and over the concentration of power in the hands of publishers, this Court should apply a meaning of 'limited Times' that would achieve the Framers' purpose. The Copyright Clause would achieve that end if read to prohibit an indefinite and endless power to extend existing terms" .
So you’re likely thinking this is insane and who has that much time on their hands to figure out all of this just for an image on a blog? In reality, though, answer question 1 of the 4-part fair use test and you’re likely to get a very good sense of whether you’ll have a leg to stand on if challenged.
#5: Are you willing to risk your site being taken down, getting a cease and desist/bill/ or being sued? The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) provides very powerful options for a copyright owner to protect his or her works in the digital space. By hitting “publish,” you may be opening a can of worms.
There are two or more sides to almost every aspect of these licenses. Each of the perceived "restrictions" has the potential to be perceived as having positive or negative consequences. For instance, allowing derivative works represents both a loss of control over how your work may be used, but it also puts you on the receiving end of more "free advertising." This is true because when others use your work, they will be promoting your work along with their own derivative creations by providing attribution and a link back to your own website (as required by all licenses that allow derivative works.) Allowing commercial works lets others profit from works containing your work within them, but it also makes using your work an option to a whole different professional class of people. Requiring that others "share alike" ensures that all derivative works will themselves be made available for others to reuse, but it may be a deal breaker for a professional filmmaker whose other contractual obligations do not allow them any flexibility.
In his judgment Justice Stevens focuses extensively on statutory and judicial interpretation of the intellectual property term. His Honour considers the history of the Patent Act and the Copyright Act, and extensions of both the patent term and the copyright term. Justice Stevens questions the adequacy of the historical analysis, as provided in the majority judgment: "A more complete and comprehensive look at the history of congressional action under the Copyright/Patent Clause demonstrates that history, in this case, does not provide the 'volume of logic,' necessary to sustain the Sonny Bono Act's constitutionality" . Justice Stevens observes: