Certain goods are not required to be reported on an export declaration. The exempted goods are listed in sections 6 and 7 of the and are further explained in .
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Mr. Chairman, I have endeavored, with as much perspicuity and candor as I ammaster of, shortly to state my objections to this clause. I would wish thecommittee to believe that they are not raised for the sake of opposition, butthat I am very sincere in my sentiments in this important investigation. TheSenate, as they are now constituted, have little or no check on them. Indeed,sir, too much is put into their hands. When we come to that part of the systemwhich points out their powers, it will be the proper time to consider thissubject more particularly.
First, they would possess legislative powers coextensive with those of theHouse of Representatives except with respect to originating revenue laws; which,however, they would have power to reject or amend, as in the case of otherbills. Secondly, they would have an importance, even exceeding that of therepresentative house, as they would be composed of a smaller number, and possessmore firmness and system. Thirdly, their consequence and dignity would stillfurther transcend those of the other branch, from their longer continuance inoffice. These powers, Mr. Livingston contended, rendered the Senate a dangerousbody.
Whether this exclusion of a man for a given period, after he shall have serveda given time, ought to be ingrafted into a constitution or not is a question,the proper decision [of which] materially depends upon the leading features ofthe government. Some governments are so formed as to produce a sufficientfluctuation and change of members; in the ordinary course of elections propernumbers of new members are from time to time brought into the legislature, and aproportionate number of old ones go out, mix, and become diffused among thepeople. This is the case with all numerous representative legislatures, themembers of which are frequently elected, and constantly within the view of theirconstituents. This is the case with our state governments, and in them aconstitutional rotation is unimportant. But in a government consisting of but afew members, elected for long periods, and far removed from the observation ofthe people, but few changes in the ordinary course of elections take place amongthe members. They become in some measure a fixed body, and often inattentive tothe public good, callous, selfish, and the fountain of corruption. To preventthese evils, and to force a principle of pure animation into the federalgovernment, which will be formed much in this last manner mentioned, and toproduce attention, activity, and a diffusion of knowledge in the community, weought to establish among others the principle of rotation. Even good men inoffice, in time, imperceptibly lose sight of the people, and gradually fall intomeasures prejudicial to them. It is only a rotation among the members of thefederal legislature I shall contend for. Judges and officers at the heads ofthe judicial and executive departments are in a very different situation. Theiroffices and duties require the information and studies of many years forperforming them in a manner advantageous to the people. These judges andofficers must apply their whole time to the detail business of their offices,and depend on them for their support. Then, they always act under masters orsuperiors, and may be removed from office for misconduct. They pursue a certainround of executive business; their offices must be in all societies confined toa few men, because but few can become qualified to fill them. And were they, byannual appointments, open to the people at large, they are offices of such anature as to be of no service to them. They must leave these offices in thepossession of the few individuals qualified to fill them, or have them badlyfilled. In the judicial and executive departments also, the body of the peoplepossess a large share of power and influence, as jurors and subordinateofficers, among whom there are many and frequent rotations. But in every freecountry the legislatures are all on a level, and legislation becomes partialwhenever, in practice, it rests for any considerable time in a few hands. It isthe true republican principle to diffuse the power of making the laws among thepeople and so to modify the forms of the government as to draw in turn the wellinformed of every class into the legislature. To determine the propriety orimpropriety of this rotation, we must take the inconveniencies as well as theadvantages attending it into view. On the one hand by this rotation, we maysometimes exclude good men from being elected. On the other hand, we guardagainst those pernicious connections, which usually grow up among men left tocontinue long periods in office. We increase the number of those who make thelaws and return to their constituents; and thereby spread information, andpreserve a spirit of activity and investigation among the people. Hence abalance of interests and exertions are preserved, and the ruinous measures ofactions rendered more impracticable. I would not urge the principle ofrotation, if I believed the consequence would be an uninformed federallegislature; but I have no apprehension of this in this enlightened country. The members of congress, at any one time, must be but very few compared with therespectable well informed men in the United States; and I have no idea therewill be any want of such men for members of congress, though by a principle ofrotation the constitution should exclude from being elected for two years thosefederal legislators, who may have served the four years immediately preceding,or any four years in the six preceding years. If we may judge from experienceand fair calculations, this principle will never operate to exclude at any oneperiod a fifteenth part even of those men who have been members of congress. Though no man can sit in congress by the confederation more than three years inany term of six years, yet not more than three, four, or five men in any onestate have been made ineligible at any one period. And if a good man happens tobe excluded by this rotation, it is only for a short time. All thingsconsidered, the inconveniencies of the principle must be very inconsiderablecompared with the many advantages of it. It will generally be expedient for aman who has served four years in congress to return home, mix with the people,and reside some time with them. This will tend to reinstate him in theinterests, feelings, and views similar to theirs, and thereby confirm in him theessential qualifications of a legislator. Even in point of information, it maybe observed, the useful information of legislators is not acquired merely instudies in offices, and in meeting to make laws from day to day. They mustlearn the actual situation of the people by being among them, and when they havemade laws, return home and observe how they operate. Thus occasionally to beamong the people, is not only necessary to prevent or banish the callous habitsand self-interested views of office in legislators, but to afford them necessaryinformation, and to render them useful. Another valuable end is answered by it,sympathy, and the means of communication between them and their constituents, issubstantially promoted. So that on every principle legislators, at certainperiods, ought to live among their constituents. Some men of science areundoubtedly necessary in every legislature; but the knowledge, generally,necessary for men who make laws, is a knowledge of the common concerns, andparticular circumstances of the people. In a republican government seats in thelegislature are highly honorable. I believe but few do, and surely none oughtto, consider them as places of profit and permanent support. Were the peoplealways properly attentive, they would, at proper periods, call their lawmakershome, by sending others in their room. But this is not often the case; andtherefore, in making constitutions, when the people are attentive, they oughtcautiously to provide for those benefits, those advantageous changes in theadministration of their affairs, which they are often apt to be inattentive toin practice. On the whole, to guard against the evils, and to secure theadvantages I have mentioned, with the greatest degree of certainty, we oughtclearly in my opinion, to increase the federal representation, to secureelections on proper principles, to establish a right to recall members, and arotation among them.
lst. The constitution itself strongly countenances such a mode ofconstruction. Most of the articles in this system, which convey powers of anyconsiderable importance, are conceived in general and indefinite terms, whichare either equivocal, ambiguous, or which require long definitions to unfold theextent of their meaning. The two most important powers committed to anygovernment, those of raising money, and of raising and keeping up troops, havealready been considered, and shown to be unlimited by any thing but thediscretion of the legislature. The clause which vests the power to pass alllaws which are proper and necessary, to carry the powers given into execution,it has been shown, leaves the legislature at liberty, to do everything, which intheir judgment is best. It is said, I know, that this clause confers no poweron the legislature, which they would not have had without it - though I believethis is not the fact, Yet, admitting it to be, it implies that the constitutionis not to receive an explanation strictly according to its letter; but morepower is implied than is expressed. And this clause, if it is to be consideredas explanatory of the extent of the powers given, rather than giving a newpower, is to be understood as declaring that in construing any of the articlesconveying power, the spirit, intent and design of the clause should be attendedto, as welt as the words in their common acceptation.
When great and extraordinary powers are vested in any man, or body of men,which in their exercise, may operate to the oppression of the people, it is ofhigh importance that powerful checks should be formed to prevent the abuse ofit.
But to return. 3. Officers may be appointed by the president and anexecutive council. When we have assigned to the legislature the appointment ofa few important officers; to the president and senate the appointment of thoseconcerned in managing foreign affairs; to the state governments the appointmentof militia officers; and authorise the legislature, by legislative acts, toassign to the president alone, to the heads of the departments, and courts oflaw respectively, the appointment of many inferior officers-we shall then wantto lodge some where a residuum of power, a power to appoint all other necessaryofficers, as established by law. The fittest receptacle for this residuarypower is clearly, in my opinion, the first executive magistrate, advised anddirected by an executive council of seven or nine members, periodically chosenfrom such proportional districts as the union may for the purpose be dividedinto. The people may give their votes for twice the number of counsellorswanted, and the federal legislature take twice the number also from the highestcandidates, and from among them choose the seven or nine, or number wanted. Such a council may be rationally formed for the business of appointments;whereas the senate, created for other purposes, never can be. Such councilsform a feature in some of the best executives in the union. They appear to beessential to every first magistrate, who may frequently want advice.
2. Officers may be appointed by the president and senate. This mode, forgeneral purposes, is clearly not defensible. All the reasoning touching thelegislature will apply to the senate. The senate is a branch of thelegislature, which ought to be kept pure and unbiased. It has a part in tryingofficers for misconduct, and in creating offices it is too numerous for acouncil of appointment, or to feel any degree of responsibility. If it has anadvantage of the legislature, in being the least numerous, it has a disadvantagein being more unsafe; add to this, the senate is to have a share in theimportant branch of power respecting treaties. Further, this sexennial senateof 26 members, representing 13 sovereign states, will not in practice be foundto be a body to advise, but to order and dictate in fact; and the president willbe a mere primus inter pares. The consequence will be that the senate, withthese efficient means of influence, will not only dictate, probably, to thepresident, but manage the house, as the constitution now stands; and underappearances of a balanced system, in reality govern alone. There may also, bythis undue connection, be particular periods when a very popular president mayhave a very improper influence upon the senate and upon the legislature. Acouncil of appointment must very probably sit all, or near all, the year. Thesenate will be too important and too expensive a body for this. By giving thesenate, directly or indirectly, an undue influence over the representatives, andthe improper means of fettering, embarrassing, or controlling the president orexecutive, we give the government in the very outset a fatal and pernicioustendency to . . . aristocracy. When we, as a circumstance not well to beavoided, admit the senate to a share of power in making treaties, and inmanaging foreign concerns, we certainly progress full far enough towards thismost undesirable point in government. For with this power, also, I believe, wemust join that of appointing ambassadors, other foreign ministers, and consuls,being powers necessarily connected. In every point of view, in which I cancontemplate this subject, it appears extremely clear to me, that the senateought not generally to be a council of appointment. The legislature, after thepeople, is the great fountain of power, and ought to be kept as pure anduncorrupt as possible, from the hankerings, biases, and contagion of offices. Then the streams issuing from it will be less tainted with those evils. It isnot merely the number of impeachments, that are to be expected to make publicofficers honest and attentive in their business. A general opinion must pervadethe community, that the house, the body to impeach them for misconduct, isdisinterested, and ever watchful for the public good; and that the judges whoshall try impeachments, will not feel a shadow of bias. Under suchcircumstances men will not dare transgress, who, not deterred by such accusersand judges, would repeatedly misbehave. We have already suffered many andextensive evils, owing to the defects of the confederation, in not providingagainst the misconduct of public officers. When we expect the law to bepunctually executed, not one man in ten thousand will disobey it. It is theprobable chance of escaping punishment that induces men to transgress. It isone important means to make the government just and honest, rigidly andconstantly to hold before the eyes of those who execute it, punishment anddismissal from office for misconduct. These are principles no candid man whohas just ideas of the essential features of a free government will controvert. They are, to be sure, at this period, called visionary, speculative andanti-governmental-but in the true style of courtiers, selfish politicians, andflatterers of despotism. Discerning republican men of both parties see theirvalue. They are said to be of no value by empty boasting advocates for theconstitution, who, by their weakness and conduct, in fact, injure its cause muchmore than most of its opponents. From their high sounding promises, men are ledto expect a defense of it, and to have their doubts removed. When a number oflong pieces appear, they, instead of the defense, etc., they expected, seenothing but a parade of names; volumes written without ever coming to the point;cases quoted between which and ours there is not the least similitude; andpartial extracts made from histories and governments, merely to serve a purpose.
In considering the legislators, in relation to the subject before us, twointeresting questions particularly arise: 1. whether they ought to be eligibleto hold any offices whatever during the period for which they shall be electedto serve, and even for some time afterwards. 2. how far they ought toparticipate in the power of appointments. As to the first, it is true thatlegislators in foreign countries, or in our state governments, are not generallymade ineligible to office. There are good reasons for it. In many countriesthe people have gone on without ever examining the principles of government. There have been but few countries in which the legislators have been aparticular set of men periodically chosen. But the principal reason is, thatwhich operates in the several states, viz., the legislators are so frequentlychosen, and so numerous, compared with the number of offices for which they canreasonably consider themselves as candidates, that the chance of any individualmember's being chosen, is too small to raise his hopes or expectations, or tohave any considerable influence upon his conduct. Among the state legislators,one man in twenty may be appointed in some committee business, etc., for a monthor two; but on a fair computation, not one man in a hundred sent to the statelegislatures is appointed to any permanent office of profit. Directly thereverse of this will evidently be found true in the federal administration. Throughout the United States, about four federal senators, and thirty-threerepresentatives, averaging the elections, will be chosen in a year. These fewmen may rationally consider themselves as the fairest candidates for a verygreat number of lucrative offices, which must become vacant in the year; andpretty clearly a majority of the federal legislators, if not excluded, will bemere expectants for public offices. I need not adduce further arguments toestablish a position so clear. I need only call to your recollection myobservations in a former letter, wherein I endeavored to show the fallacy of theargument, that the members must return home and mix with the people. It issaid, that men are governed by interested motives, and will not attend aslegislators, unless they can, in common with others, be eligible to offices ofhonor and profit. This will undoubtedly be the case with some men, but Ipresume only with such men as never ought to be chosen legislators in a freecountry. An opposite principle will influence good men. Virtuous patriots, andgenerous minds, will esteem it a higher honor to be selected as the guardians ofa free people. They will be satisfied with a reasonable compensation for theirtime and service; nor will they wish to be within the vortex of influence. Thevaluable effects of this principle of making legislators ineligible to officesfor a given time, has never yet been sufficiently attended to or considered. Iam assured that it was established by the convention after long debate, andafterwards, on an unfortunate change of a few members, altered. Could thefederal legislators be excluded in the manner proposed, I think it would be animportant point gained; as to themselves, they would be left to act much morefrom motives consistent with the public good. In considering the principle ofrotation I had occasion to distinguish the condition of a legislator from thatof a mere official man. We acquire certain habits, feelings, and opinions, asmen and citizens-others, and very different ones, from a long continuance inoffice. It is, therefore, a valuable observation in many bills of rights, thatrulers ought frequently to return and mix with the people. A legislature, in afree country, must be numerous; it is in some degree a periodical assemblage ofthe people, frequently formed. The principal officers in the executive andjudicial departments must have more permanency in office. Hence it may beinferred, that the legislature will remain longer uncorrupted and virtuous;longer congenial to the people, than the officers of those departments. If itis not, therefore in our power to preserve republican principles for a series ofages, in all the departments of government, we may a long while preserve them ina well formed legislature. To this end we ought to take every precaution toprevent legislators becoming mere office-men; choose them frequently, make themrecallable, establish rotation among them, make them ineligible to offices, andgive them as small a share as possible in the disposal of them. Add to this, alegislature in the nature of things is not formed for the detail business ofappointing officers, there is also generally an impropriety in the same menmaking offices and filling them, and a still greater impropriety in theirimpeaching and trying the officers they appoint. For these and other reasons, Iconclude the legislature is not a proper body for the appointment of officers ingeneral. But having gone through with the different modes of appointment, Ishall endeavor to show what share in the distribution of the power ofappointments the legislature must, from necessity, rather than from propriety,take.