Bosnian war (March 1, 1992 – December 14, 1995;) is an acute ethnic conflict on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (former SR Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of Yugoslavia) between the armed forces of the Serbs (Army of Republika Srpska), Muslim autonomists (people’s Defence of Western Bosnia), Bosnians (the army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Croats (Croatian Defence Council). At the initial stage of the war, the Yugoslav people’s army also took participation. The further stages of the conflict involved the army of Croatia, volunteers and mercenaries from all sides and NATO armed forces.
Use free sample research papers on the topic to understand that Bosnian war began following the breakup of Yugoslavia. After the secession of Slovenia and Croatia from the Yugoslavia Republic in 1991, it was the turn of the multi-national Bosnia and Herzegovina Socialist Republic, which were primarily populated by Bosniaks (44%, mostly Moslems), Serbs (31%, mostly Orthodox) and Croats (17%, mainly Roman Catholics). A referendum on independence was held on February 29, 1992. However, the results were rejected by Bosnian Serb leaders, who did not recognized the results and declared Bosnian Serb Republic. After the declaration of independence, a war broke out in which the Bosnian Serbs have received support from the Government of Serbia, headed by Slobodan Milosevic, and the Yugoslav people’s army. Soon after hostilities have flared up throughout the Republic and the first ethnic cleansing began, primarily in Eastern Bosnia against Bosniak population.
The plan was described by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe as "the first time since the beginning of the war that the Europeans, Americans and Russians have agreed not on a vague formula, but on numerous details for an overall settlement." Neither the Bosnian government nor any Bosnian Serb official had, as of May 25, indicated that the new proposals were acceptable, however.
confirms that Croatian army troops had crossed into Bosnia to assist Bosnian Croat militia units in the Mostar fighting, despite Croatian government's previous denials that any of its troops were involved in the war in Bosnia.
The EC declined, for the time being, to recognize either Macedonia or Bosnia-Herzegovina due to concern that immediate recognition might spread the Yugoslav civil war to those republics.
The State Department goals were thus to sponsor a weak Bosnian Muslim-ruled and Muslim-dominated Bosnia (although Muslims were a minority to the Christian---Serbian and Croatian---majority) dependent upon the US for security, economic development, and political viability, to contain and neutralize the dominant independent power in the region, Serbia, create a "balance of power", and thereby to advance American interests with this increase in influence and control and the opening of new markets ripe for exploitation, "economic globalism", which the ill-fated Ron Brown mission in 1996 sought to advance. A further goal was to prevent a bad precedent or example from being set for the new states or fledgling democracies of the former Soviet Union. By these policies, the US State Department denied the Serbian population of Bosnia their inherent right to self-determination and self-rule and autonomy. Why was not a referendum supported which would allow the population of Bosnia to democratically decide its own national future? Why does the US support such a referendum for Kosovo Albanians but not for Bosnian Serbs or Krajina Serbs? The civil war which followed was then inevitable but due mainly on disastrous and misguided US policies which made it so.
Bosnia met all the State Department criteria for US sponsorship: 1) the Bosnian Muslim dominated and Muslim-controlled government for be dependent upon the US for defense, development, and viability; 2) a Bosnian Muslim-dominated Bosnia would act as a bulward against the independent Serbian state, a balance of power would emerge; and, 3) American geopolitical interests would be advanced because political, military, and commercial influence and markets would be gained in the Balkan region, which was formerly outside the American sphere of influence, and a potential enemy would be neutralized. Opening markets suitable for exploitation by US commercial interests had always guided US neo-imperialism, "globalism". The US Ambassador to former Yugoslavia, the self-styled "last ambassador", Warren Zimmermann, admitted that American policy in Bosnia was based on the prevention of the Serbian population of Bosnia from exercising its inherent right to self-determination. With regard to the Bosnian Serb population, the US policy was anti-democratic and sought to defeat the popular will of the masses. Zimmermann opposed Bosnian Serb autonomy and self-rule in Bosnia and instead rushed to recognize Bosnia and thus "internationalizing the conflict", which meant preventing the Serbian population from deciding its own national fate and making a mockery of democracy which the US espoused for propaganda purposes. The propaganda ploy did not fool anyone. The war was on. Zimmermann explained this anti-Serbian and anti-democratic policy in the New York Times, August 29, 1993:
Once the dismemberment of the 72 year old state of Yugoslavia was an accomplished fact due to the intense diplomatic efforts of Germany, US policy makers embarked upon a policy to recruit the secessionist "new states" of the former Yugoslavia as client states. The US sought to recognize and sponsor new states which would be dependent upon the US and which would act as bulwarks against the dominant regional power in the region whose interests were adverse to those of the US, a neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist "balance of power" theory. With regard to the former Soviet Union, the major power or successor state to be contained and neutralized was Russia; with the former Yugoslavia, the power was Serbia. US policy makers had a complex and delicate problem with the containment of Russia, which US policy makers sought to contain but not to unduly antagonize because Russia was still a threat to American interests and still remained a threat to American security. Thus, American policy makers had to walk a fine line with regard to Russia. Full NATO membership to former Warsaw Pact nations was postponed by the creation of the Partnership for Peace program, which would temporarily postpone the inevitable and give Boris Yeltsin a face saving measure at home. Such a delicate and intricate high wire act, however, was neither necessary nor desired with regard to Serbia. Serbia was not a threat to USA security and was not vital to American interests. Serbia, indeed, presented the sole obstacle to NATO expansion in the Balkans. Moreover, Serbia rejected the status of a satellite or puppet state of the US. Serbia was pursuing an independent course. This did not fit the script for the New World Order. Initially, Serbia was seen as another Iraq, in other words, Serbia was expendable as serving no useful purpose to US interests and in fact having interests inimical to those of the US. The US State Department perceived the "new states" of Bosnia and Croatia as ideal for sponsorship, they would be pliant "Balkan banana republics" and "fledgling democracies".
The 1992 Lisbon Agreement between the three ethnic factions in Bosnia was a political settlement of the crisis which prevented a civil war. Warren Zimmermann has admitted, however, that he persuaded the Bosnian Muslim political leaders, Alija Izetbegovic and Ejup Ganic, to renounce the Lisbon Agreement, where the three factions agreed to make Bosnia a republic divided into three ethnic regions associated in a confederation, much like the Swiss confederation made up of German, French, and Italian cantons. Swiss-like cantonization was a viable and realistic compromise solution to the Bosnia conflict and was a model that may have worked for all of former Yugoslavia. This was the only realistic and practical solution which would be fair to all the ethnic minorities of the former Yugoslavia who lost any safeguards once the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia was dismembered into ethnically homogenous national states. Germany and the US State Department would have nothing to do with any compromises or safeguards for ethnic minorities such as the Krajina Serbs in Croatia. Former UN commander in Bosnia, Canadian general Lewis MacKenzie, conceded that the Bosnia disaster resulted due to "premature recognition" and by the absence of any agreement safeguarding ethnic minorities. The US State Department policy was to encourage the Bosnian Muslim leaders to break with the proposed partition plan, to unilaterally and to unconditionally reject and to renounce the Lisbon Agreement. A high ranking State Department official, "who asked not to be identified", admitted in the August 29, 1993 New York Times that the "policy was to encourage Izetbegovic to break with the partition plan." He stated that "we let it be known we would support his Government in the United Nations if they got into trouble." Richard Johnson, the Yugoslav desk officer at the State department stated that James Baker, the Secretary of State, "told the Europeans to stop pushing ethnic cantonization of Bosnia." He further maintained that "we pressed the Europeans to move forward on recognition. Recognition soon followed and the civil war in Bosnia erupted and spread throughout the republic. Henry Kissinger noted that premature recognition "called into being a civil war, not a country." In , Susan L. Woodward concluded that "the purpose of recognition … was not to end violence but … to assert power and leadership within the Euro-Atlantic alliance …so that that the United States could join the allies and respond to its Croatian lobby." Negotiator David Owen, former US NATO commander Charles G. Boyd, and George Kenney of the State Department admitted that recognition had been premature and provocative and had led to the civil war. The evidence shows clearly the complicity of the US State Department in causing and unleashing the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic warned that by abandoning the Lisbon Agreement and giving the Bosnian Muslims the green light to wage a civil war would result in the needless loss of life and in wanton destruction, a civil war would result in ‘hundreds of thousand dead and hundreds of towns destroyed'. The US State Department has never accepted responsibility for its complicity and guilt in causing the Bosnian civil war.
Austrian Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 1908 Political opposition by Serbia and Montenegro was supported diplomatically by Russia and Britain while Germany supported Austria's right to the territories, forming the outlines of competing alliances during World War I.